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discretionary fiscal policy and how it impacts the volatility of output and inflation. Model Vector Error
Correction Model (VECM) was applied over quarterly data, covering the period 1990 to 2009. Empirical
results showed that there is a cointegration relationship between government spending and taxes with
respect to output in the long-run.Unlike government spending, in the long-term, taxation has a positive
effect on economic growth. Short-term adjustment suggests that anincrease in government spending
has a positive effect on output, while a tax increase has a negative effect. There is a greater influence of
government spending on output in the short term compared to taxation policies. Therefore, government
spending is more effective to stimulate economic growth especially in times of recession, compared to
taxation policies. While the increase in government spending causes a decrease in inflation, tax increases
lead to higher inflation. This study also indicates the absence of discretionary fiscal policy made by the
government of Indonesia.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Background
Fiscal policy is one policy for controlling the balance of macroeconomic. It is aimed at
influencing the aggregate demand side of the economy in the short term. In addition, fiscal
policy may also affect the supply side that is more long-term, through increased economic
capacity. In the macroeconomic stability management, fiscal policy will interact with monetary
policy.
Keynes stated that there is a significant influence of fiscal policy on the economy. Prior
toKeynes, a government»s financial operations were considerednot to have a significant influence
on the level of employment and aggregate demand. The role of government at that time was
limited to reallocate its financial resources from the private sector to the government. This view
supported by Say»s Law that under conditions of full employment, each increase in government
spending will cause a decrease in private spending (crowding out) in the same amount of
spending, resulting the same amount of aggregate income.
This view was later altered by Keynes, and sincethen economists gave emphasis on the
macroeconomics effects of government spending and taxes. Keynes highlighted that the
increases in government spending did not merely move resources from the private sector to the
government, but also stressed on the multiplier effect of these expenditures.
Research on the multiplier effects, both in developed and developing countries generally
have been carried out using simulation methods on macroeconomic models and reduced form
equation method. The use of both methods for the case of Japan concluded that the multiplier
resulting from the reduced form equation methods tend to be smaller than the results of
macroeconomic model simulations.
As stated by Hemming, R., et.al (2002)2, the simulation results of some of the
macroeconomic models and the reduced form equation approach in developed countries,
showed positive short-term multipliers of fiscal policy.Multiplier value is within a fairly wide
range, from 0.1 to 3.1. From the various macro models, it was also concluded that the multiplier
is much smaller, which likely reflects a change in the structure of the model.In the early decades
of the 70»s and 80»s most structured Keynesian macro models were backward-looking
expectations.In a further development, the structure of the model began to include
intertemporal budget constraints, and used forward-looking expectations variables, such as
exchange rates.
Meanwhile, Hemming, R., et.al also summarized researches on the same issues in
developing countries, and concluded that the direction and magnitude of fiscal multipliers in
2 ≈The Effectiveness of Fiskal Policy in Stimulating Economic ActivityƒA Review of the Literature∆, Hemming, Richard, et. al. , IMF
Working Paper WP/02/208.
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the secountries are inconclusive. The study by Haque and Montiel (1991), for example, concluded
that the impact of increased government spending in the short to medium-term is contractive.
These results are attributed to the existence of crowding out, namely an increase in government
spending would increase the real interest rate resulting in a contractionary impact on output.
While a study by Haque, Montiel, and Symansky (1991) showed that although increases in
government spending initially led to lower output, it will raise output and inflation in subsequent
periods. Meanwhile, Khan and Knight (1981) concluded that the nominal income elasticity of
government spending and taxes is positive and close to 1. These conclusions are drawn from a
sample of 29 developing countries by applying a modified monetary model assuming endogeneity
of inflation and output.
Given the research in several developed and developing countries did not rely only on
one method of use, thereforein the case of Indonesia it is necessary to examine the effects of
government spending by using other methods, such as reduced form equations. This alternative
method is seen to complement the simulation of macroeconomic models that already exist,
and can provide an alternative assessment of the effects of government spending.
In addition to the effects of government spending on output, another important aspect
is the problem of fiscal policy synchronization with the business cycle economy. Ideally, fiscal
policy acts as an automatic stabilizer for the economy. When the economy is undergoing an
expansion, then government spending should be reduced or tax revenue increased. Conversely,
if the economy is contracting, fiscal policy should be expansionary through increased spending
or reduce tax revenue. Thus, the automatic stabilizers of fiscal policy require the function of a
countercyclical fiscal policy.
For the case of Indonesia, a study conducted by Akitoby, et.al. (2004) and Baldacci
(2009) had not found any counter-cyclicality in fiscal policy. The Indonesian fiscal policy
tends to be more acyclical or even procyclical. This conclusion is also confirmed by research
of Hidayah Dhini Ari and Myrnawati Savitri (2009)3 that found Indonesian fiscal policy tends
to be acyclical in aggregate or even procyclical if expenditures are grouped. The cyclical
properties have the potential of putting pressures of instability in the economy4, such as
rising inflation. By putting the ratio of government expenditure, excluding interest payments,
and the economic growth in a graph showed a same directionof these two variables after
the 1998 crisis. Prior to 1998 economic crisis, the relationship between these two variables
was in the opposite direction.
In general, the reason why developing countries have not adopted countercyclical fiscal
policy is mostly related to financial resource constraints and institutional weaknesses. Institutional
weaknesses were related to the presence of influential groups in society who seek their interests
to be accommodated by the government. This weakness can lead to discretionary fiscal policy
3 ≈Siklikalitas Kebijakan Fiskal di Indonesia∆, Research Note No.11/15/DKM/BRE/CR, Bank Indonesia.
4   Alesina dan Tabellini (2005), ≈Why is Fiscal Policy Often Procyclical?∆, NBER WP 11600, hal. 2.
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that influences higher inflation volatility. The transmission of fiscal policy to inflation can be
through aggregate demand, spillovers of public wages to private sector, as well as the effect of
taxes on private sector marginal costs and consumption. In addition, fiscal policy can create
inflation through public expectations concerning the government»s ability to re-pay its debt. As
the cyclicality of Indonesian fiscal policy has not led to counter-cyclicality, Indonesian discretionary
fiscal policy needs to be studied to see how it effects inflation.
More explicitly, the main objective of this paper is to examine the effects of fiscal policy
on output and prices. Fiscal policy here includes the effects of government spending and
government tax revenue on output and prices. Secondly, the paper examines whether there is
a discretionary fiscal policy in Indonesia and if so, how does it impact output and inflation
volatility.
The second part of the paper reviews the theoretical basis. The third section discusses the
methodology and data used, while the fourth section is a review of the results and analysis.
Conclusions and implications of the study will be the concluding section.
II. THEORY
2.1. Effects of Fiscal Policy on Output and Inflation
The existing literature on the effects of fiscal policy can be classified into two groups: the
demand side and the supply side effect. The effect of fiscal policy on the supply side has long-
term implications. Fiscal policy oriented to increase the supply side can overcome the problem
of limited production capacity and therefore have a more long-term effect.
Figure 1.
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The effect of fiscal policy on the economy through the aggregate demand approach is
described by Keynes» approach. The Keynesian approach assumes the existence of price rigidity
and excess capacity so that outputs are determined by aggregate demand (demand driven).
Keynes said that in a recession, the market-based economy will not be able to recover without
intervention from the government. Monetary policy is powerless to restore the economy because
it depends only on interest rate cuts policy while in recession interest rates are already low and
can even be close to zero.
In the Keynesian approach, fiscal policy can drive the economy because increased
government spending or tax cuts have a multiplier effect by stimulating additional demand for
household consumer goods. Similarly, the government can make tax cuts as economic stimulus.
Tax cuts will increase disposable income and in turn affect demand. The key for multiplier effect
is higher marginal prospensity to consume (mpc) as disposable income increasing.
The government spending multiplier is expressed as 1/(1-mpc) and this formula shows
that the greater the mpc, the greater the impact of government expenditure to the GDP.
Meanwhile, the multiplier effect of tax cuts (tax cut multiplier) is expressed as (1/(1-mpc) - 1).
The tax cut multiplier is reduced by the government spending multiplier. The tax cut multiplier
is always less than the spending multiplier, because tax cuts are considered to have a lower
potential to spur economic growth in the recession than an increase in government spending.
The magnitude of the multiplier effect of increased government spending and tax cuts
are largely influenced by the magnitude of the mpc which depends on whether the increase is
transitory or permanent. In this case, the effects of the mpc on changes in transitory income are
less compared to a permanent change in income.
Further development of the Keynesian model allows the addition of crowding out effects
through changes in interest rates and exchange rates. Crowding out occurs when government
provides goods and services that substitute goods and services produced by the private sector.
The level of crowding out affects the magnitude of the fiscal multiplier, but does not affect the
direction.
Within the framework of Keynesian theory, the increase in government spending shifts
the IS curve to the right, (see Figure 2). This shift leads to a new economy in equilibrium
(from point A to point B) where income levels and interest rates higher. Interest rates are
higher due to the increase in income caused by an increase in demand for real money
balances, while in the money market, the central bank does not increase the supply of real
money balances. The increase in interest rates will in turn affect the market for goods,
namely a review of business investment plans. Thus, the decline in investment spending
would reduce the expansionary effect of government spending. If there is no crowding out,
based on the Keynesian Cross, then the output will be Y3. However, the crowding out causes
output only to rise to become Y2.
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Figure 2.
Crowding Out
In the IS-LM model with an open economy (Mundell-Flemming), crowding out can occur
via the exchange rate. High interest rates will attract capital inflow resulting in an appreciation
of the exchange rate and lead to a decrease in the current account. In turn a decrease in the
external current account would annul the first increase in domestic demand fuelled by fiscal
expansion.
The magnitude of the effect of crowding out through interest rates and exchange rates
are influenced by several factors in the IS-LM framework. Crowding out through interest rates
will be greater when investments are sensitive to changes in interest rates. The more sensitive
the demand for money to interest rate changes than to changes in income, the greater the
effect of crowding out.
The level of crowding out is also influenced by price flexibility and the exchange rate
regime of an economy. In the short-term, price flexibility has the potential to reduce the fiscal
multiplierIn a closed economy, a fiscal expansion will push up the price so as to inhibit the
increase in aggregate demand in the short term and ultimately strengthen the crowding out
through interest rates.
In an open economy with a flexible exchange rate system, the level of crowding out
depends on the response of domestic prices to changes in exchange rates. If the price changes
are in line withappreciation of the exchange rate, the level of crowding out that occurs will be
smaller than in conditions with price rigidity. This is because the exchange rate appreciation will
reduce the price. On the other hand, in a system with fixed exchange rates, crowding out will
be higher in price flexible conditions than in conditions with price rigidity.
Empirical studies on the relationship between fiscal policies with economic activity gave
mixed results. Standard Real Business Cycle (RBC) model generally pointed out that consumption
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will decline in response to increased government spending, while the IS-LM model (Keynesian)
indicated otherwise. Therefore the debate about the relationship between fiscal policies to
economic activity continues. Regardless of the debate, most studies still show that there is a
relationship that is based on Keynesian theory.
Blanchard and Perotti (1999), Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Kruscek (2003),
and Castro (2003), each of which used a sample of the U.S., the OECD countries, the European
Union, Germany and Spain found that a positive shock on government spending (deficit
increased by a flat tax) has a positive effect on output, although its effects tend to weak.
Meanwhile, a positiveshock on taxes by letting the government keep its spendingconstant has
a negative effect on output. These results were also confirmed by Hemming (2002) who
found that the Keynesian multiplier is positive but relatively small with a consumption effect
on current income. Meanwhile, studies by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990, 1996) and Giavazzi et
al (2000) stated that the Keynesian Effect does not apply.
Although empirical studies using a sample from developing countries are still very limited,
one of them was performed by Schlarek (2005). Schlarek used panel data involving 40 countries
and 19 of them from developing countries. Empirical results showed that the shock of
government spending has the Keynesian effect on private consumption in both the industrial
and developing countries. The tax effect only has the Keynesian effect in developing countries.
Schlarek also found that the shock of government spending has a Keynesian effect on private
consumption higher in developing countries than in developed countries.
There is no evidence of the Keynesian effect as proposed by Levine and Renelt (1992)
according to Fu, et al (2003) due to the use of separate fiscal indicators. The use of one of the
variables identified fiscal policy alone is not enough to be able to capture the stance of fiscal
policy. For example an increase in government spending can be said to be expansive if it is
financed by an increase in the deficit. However, government spending can be categorized as
contractionary if it is financed by tax increases because the policy could have implications on
the increasing role of the public sector. These results were confirmed by research of Martin
and Fardmanesh (1990), Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) and Fu, et al (2003) that tax cuts can
have a positive effect on economic growth only when public capital is kept constant.
In the case of Indonesia, the application of Keynesian theory in some macro-economic
models has been developed by Bank Indonesia, including SOFIE and SEMAR, in line with the
empirical findings5. However, the degree of influence on the output is different for each
model. In SOFIE, the increase in government spending, either in consumption or investment,
amounting to Rp10 trillion will increase GDP by 0.3%. While the addition of government
spending for infrastructure programs of Rp10, 8 trillion GDP would increase by 0.0512% in
the SEMAR model. Difference is probably caused by the influence of the nature of these two
different models, namely the dynamic stochastic SOFIE, while SEMAR ismore static
deterministic.
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2.2. The Effect of Fiscal Policy on Inflation
In general economy setting, a function of the central bank is controlling the price level.
This is related to the quantity theory of money by Milton Friedman who stated that ≈inflation is
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon∆. However, this traditional view was challenged
by the fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL), developed by Leeper (1991), (Woodford (1994.1995),
and Sims (1994), which states that fiscal policy plays an important role in price determination
through the budget constraint associated with the debt policy, spending and taxation.
Fiscal theory of the price level (FTPL) can be explained by the two approaches, namely the
weak form FTPL and strong form FTPL. Weak form FTPL reflects the dominance of fiscal policy
(fiscal dominance) explained by the existence of a link between fiscal policy and monetary
policy through seigniorage. Because seigniorage (revenue from printing money) is one source
of government revenue, the long-term monetary and fiscal policies are determined at the same
time by the fiscal budget constraint.
Weak form FTPL assumes that the fiscal authorities will move ahead with setting the
primary budget surplus / deficit and then respond by creating seigniorage by monetary authorities
to maintain the solvency of the Government. If the authorities refuse to create seignorage, the
debt to GDP ratio can be increased in an unsustainable manner. This in turn will have an effect
to increase real interest rates and government debt in line with increasing demand by the
market premium. However, this process cannot continue. One of the policy authorities has to
change. Weak form FTPL assumes that the central bank will respond by creating seignorage to
avoid default. Therefore this theory also states that fiscal policy helps determine the future
inflation through money growth. This theory simply states that the money supply is the main
cause of the fiscal authority. In other words, fiscal policy is exogenous while the movement of
money supply is endogenous.
In contrast to the weak form FTPL, where money supply is endogenous to meet the
government budget constraint, strong form FTPL assumes both fiscal policy and monetary
policy are exogenous and that prices adjust to ensure government solvency.
FTPL departs from an understanding of equal velocity of money and the government
budget constraint. Velocity of money in period t (V
t
) is expressed as the ratio of nominal output
(price level P
t 
 multiplied by real output Y
t
) of nominal money balances. In this equation the
price level is proportional to the money supply.
(1)
5 SOFIE and SEMAR are macro models developed internally at Bank Indonesia. These modelsdo not use tax variables in its modeling.
SOFIE is a macroeconometric model, while SEMAR is a Computable General Equilibrium Model with Input-Output Tables 2005.
V
t
 = P
t
 . Y
t 
/ M
t
Furthermore the price level is determined  M
t, 
Y
t
 and V
t 
 by taking into account the entire
balance in the trajectory of the economy. Balance is defined in two conditions, namely the balance
375The Impact of Fiscal Policy on The Output and Inflation
of the government financial balance and equilibrium in the money market. Equilibrium in the
money market where the demand for real money equalsthe real money supply defined as:
Where the real money demand is a function of nominal interest rate (R = r + π ) and π is the
inflation rate. Money demand is a function of inflation because real interest rates and output is
assumed constant. M0 is the nominal money stock at the beginning of the period of the model
and P0 is the prevailing price level.
The government financial balance sheet is expressed as:
(2)M0 /P0    =  f (R)
(3)D + S (π) 
    
=  B0 /P0
where S(π) (S’(π) > 0) states present value of seignorage. D is the present value of future
primary budget surplus (negative represent deficit). The present discounted value of seigniorage
is S = πf(π)/f.
The accumulated value of the total real government debt maturing in the beginning of
period denoted as (B0 /P0 ) must be equal to the present value of the future primary budget
surplus plus the revenue from seigniorage. Under conditions where the Ricardian Equivalence
does not occur and with an independent central bank, the imbalances in intertemporal budget
constraint must be adjusted to the movement of price levels. In other words if the perceived
level of the primary surplus is not sufficient to ensure the fiscal solvency and the central bank
does not create seigniorage, then the balance will be obtained through the price level. Adjustment
will occur through a mechanism called wealth effect.
Empirical studies of the FTPL are still limited and the results are relatively diverse. The
main constraints of these studies are that the behavior of price increases caused by fiscal policy
can only be identified if the government»s intertemporal budget constraintis not balance.
2.3. Discretionary Fiscal Policy on Output and Inflation Volatility
Discretionary policy, monetary and fiscal policies, is often the topic of public debate. In
the monetary sector, the debate about the discretion has reached on the understanding that
monetary policy should be free from government intervention, namely by establishing an
independent central bank. However, for fiscal policy, no agreement has been reached on the
mechanisms and institutions that can avoid the decisions maker to choose discretionary policy.
Discretionary fiscal policy is defined as a change or a reaction to fiscal policy that does not
reflect a reaction to the current economic conditions (Fatas and Mihov, 2003). Fiscal policy can
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be categorized into three groups: (1) automatic stabilizers; (2) discretionary fiscal policy as a
response to economic conditions, and (3) discretionary policy conducted for reasons other than
the current macroeconomic conditions. In essence, it serves as an automatic fiscal stabilizer in
the economy, which requires the countercyclical nature of the policy. In addition, the application
of discretionary fiscal policy can be both a response to economic developments as well as
response that have no background to the macroeconomic conditions.
Academics have not reached agreement on the method of measurement of appropriate
fiscal policy discretion (Fatas and Mihov, 2003). According to Blanchard (1990), to distinguish
between fiscal policy and discretionary fiscal policy, any benchmark can be used. For example,
changes in inflation, interest rates and economic growth within a certain time can be
examined.
Measurement of discretionary fiscal policy by Fatas & Mihov focused on the three
components above:
(4)
where G is the real government expenditure; Y  is the real GDP, both in the value of the logarithm;
W is a control variable, including time trends, inflation and inflation squared; while 
t  
is a
quantitative estimate of the discretionary policy shock in government spending (discretionary
spending policy shock).
On the other hand, discretionary fiscal policy can jeopardize macroeconomic stability.
Therefore, there is aview that fiscal policy needs restriction. On the other hands, there is also
aview that fiscal policy should not be restrictive. The reasons underlying this view is that fiscal
policy can smooth business cycle fluctuations through expansionary government spending, tax
cuts in a recession, and a contractionary fiscal policy whenthe economy is in an expansionary
phase A cross-section study by Fatas and Mihov (2003) showed that countries aggressively
implementing fiscal policy will have less desirable volatility and lead to lower economic
growth.The study also concluded that political interest restrictions in fiscal policy implementation
are supportive in reducing fiscal discretion.
Among other things, fiscal discretion may push inflation volatility. Studies on the effects
of fiscal policy on inflation in general can be divided into two parts, the study focused on a
longer period of time related to the impact of fiscal deficits on inflation and the study of fiscal
discretion against inflation. Meanwhile, the effect of fiscal policy to inflation according to Rother
(2004) may occur through the effect of fiscal policy in influencing aggregate demand, the
spillover of wages of civil servants (public wages) to the private sector and through the impact
of taxes on marginal costs and private consumption. In addition, fiscal policy can affect inflation
through the public expectations of the Government»s ability to pay its debts.
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Rother (2004), using a data panel of 15 industrialized countries, concluded that the
volatility of fiscal policy significantly affect the volatility of inflation6, with a positive sign. This
means that changes in the fiscal policy stance of the current period (t) and the previous period
(t-1) increases the volatility of inflation in the current period (t). Volatility of discretionary fiscal
rise by 1 standard deviation will cause an increase in unconditional 7 volatility of inflation on
average by 10%, and 17% for the conditional 8  volatility of inflation. From a policy perspective,
these results indicate that fiscal discretion affects de-stabilization rather than the stability of the
macro economy.
Study of the effects of fiscal policy on inflation is usually done by studying the relationship
between fiscal policy and monetary policy and its impact on inflation. It is understood, that
within the framework, macroeconomic, monetary and fiscal policies will affect inflation through
the impact of the policy to changes in aggregate demand and supply sides. The question is
what condition a fiscal policy can affect monetary policy and inflation further. One logical
explanation is through the dependent central bank. If the government can intervene monetary
policy, there is a possibility the government will use force to support the measures taken. To
finance its deficit, for example, the Government will ask the central bank to buttressit or ask to
keep interest rates at low levels in order to lower its interest payments. Similarly, in case of
conflict the Government will force central banks to support the policy (Sargent and Wallace,
1981).
However, an independent central bank also has an incentive to create inflation surprise in
response to fiscal changes. Similar to the time-inconsistency problem, as applied in the Barro
and Gordon (1983), an independent central bank will push inflation higher if the central bank
considers that the Government fiscal consolidation could lead to higher costs for the economy.
The conflict can be resolved if the central bank has independence (Rogoff, 1985) or applies
certain policy rules such as an inflation targeting framework policy that uses inflation as a
primary goal.
Empirical studies on the relationship between level of fiscal deficit and inflation through
monetary policy are still inconclusive. Some studies conclude that the separation of the central
bank from the government encourages low inflation. This supports the hypothesis that
government intervention can improve the monetary policy of inflation. However, other studies
(Fuhrer 1997, Campillo and Miron 1996) indicate that the influence of central bank independence
decreases when considering other factors.
Allesina and Grill (1992) argued that delegating monetary policy to the parties that are
more inflationaverse than the public preferences, is a form of commitment to support low
6 Volatility of inflation is calculated using the standard deviation of monthly inflation.
7 Standard deviation of monthly inflation (mtm) in a calendar year, which measures short-term fluctuations in inflation.
8  Standard deviation of forecast error in one period ahead is generated from time-series models. This implicitly assumes that fiscal
discretion causes inflation projections to be more difficult, as reflected in the greater forecast error.
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inflation. The argument constructed shows that the ≈median voter∆ community, will choose a
central bank that is more inflation averse than themselves. However, the ≈median voter∆ wants
to be ≈time inconsistent∆ and recall their support from a central bank that is very conservative
about inflation.
Allesina and Summers (1993) conducted a study to look at the relationship between the
independent central bank and macroeconomic performance. The study generally concluded
that an independent central bank will affect low inflation. Assuming that a low inflation level
will provide low-inflation variability, an independent central bank will reduce the variability of
inflation. However, an independent central bank has no correlation with other economic
indicators such as economic growth, unemployment, and interest rates. Rogoff (1985) stated
that dynamic inconsistency theories of inflation that was developed by Kydland and Prescott
(1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983), allows a more independent central bank to lower the
inflation rate. Kydland and Prescott Further (1977) stated that discretionary policy, where the
decision-makers choose the best policy in accordance with the existing conditions, will not
yield a maximum social welfare. However, with a rules-based policy, the economic performance
can be improved.
Furthermore, there are some reasons why an independent central bank will have a positive
impact on the economy. Firstly, the behavior of an independent central bank is predictable that
will encourage economic stability, thus lower the interest rate risk premium. To that end, the
central bank will seek to avoid any manipulation that is usually done before an election (as the
model of Nordhaus, 1975, and Rogoff and Silbert, 1988) or reduce the shock after the election
made by the party winning the election (as a model Hibbs (1987) and Allesina (1988, 1989).
Secondly, given the high inflation would have a bad effect on the economy, the central bank
will attempt to reduce inflationary pressures.
The importance of the inflation volatility has become an important aspect in the literature
that discusses the relationship between inflation and growth. Fromthe academic point of view,
there is a prevailing opinionthat inflation and high inflation volatility is harmfulfor growth.
Judson and Orphanides (1999) found evidence that inflation volatility, calculated by the standard
deviation of the rate of inflation (intra-year), contributes significantly in reducing economic
growth. These findings support the theory of Friedman (1977) that the negative effect of inflation
on the growth brought about by inflation volatility. In line with the findings of this theoryare
Froyen and Waud (1987) who found that high inflation pushed the high inflation volatility and
uncertainty in the USA, Germany, Canada, and UK, and ultimately had a negative effect on
economic growth. Similar findings were obtained by Al-Marhubi (1998) who also found a
negative relationship between economic growth and inflation volatility based on a study panel
data from 78 countries. In contrast to the above study, Blanchard and Simon (2001) found a
strong positive relationship between inflation volatility and the output volatility in major industrial
countries.
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III. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Data and Variables
There are essentially three fiscal policy variables that are commonly used, namely
expenditure (spending), receipt (tax revenue) and the fiscal deficit. The latest is the difference
between revenues and expenditures. The existing literature generally does not specify which
variable is better to use for analysis. According to Fu et all (2003), who quoted the opinion of
Levine and Renelt (1992), none of the three fiscal policy variables that affect economic growth
proved robust when used separately. The use of only one variable is not expected to be fully
adequate to capture the stance of fiscal policy. For example, an increase in government spending
is categorized expansive when it is financed by an increase in the deficit. But the opposite can
also be categorized contractive if it is financed by tax increases. Therefore the combined use of
the fiscal policy variables is recommended in the equation.
This study uses the variables in the model used by Perotti (2002) as contained in Table 1
with quarterly data frequency from 1990: Q1 to 2009: Q4. All data are expressed in logarithms.
Fatas and Mihov (2001) stated that the five variables below are the minimum macro variables
needed to study the effect of fiscal policy.
Table 1.
Fiscal Policy Variables
Note :
1) the cyclical effect has been eliminated using X11 method in E-Views.
* From Department of Economic & Monetary Statistics
No. Variable Description Scope of Data Source
1 LTSPNDRLSA1) Includes central and
regional government
expenditure. For central
government expenditure,
excluding interest payments
on debt.
Bank Indonesia *
2 LTTAXRLSA1) Total real tax revenue
3 LGDPRLSA1) Real Gross Domestic Product Central Bureau of Statistics
4 LCPI Consumer Price Index Central Bureau of Statistics
5 LDEP_3 3 month deposit rate Bank Indonesia *
Total government expenditure in
real terms (including central
government expenditure, except
interest payment and regional
government expenditure). The real
value is obtained by dividing the
nominal value with the CPI.
Bank Indonesia *
Given the State Budget of Indonesia during 1970-2009 was relatively manageable at
below 3% of GDP, in this study we use the definition of discretionary fiscal policy as the deviation
of the actual government expenditure from its planned expenditure. This deviation will then be
examined for its stationarity. If stationary, then the deviation is random and it can be concluded
that there is no discretionary fiscal policy.
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The term Government expenditure used in this study is total government expenditure
excluding interest payments. Government spending plans are compiled from the Financial
Memorandum prepared each fiscal year. The realization of government spendings are from the
audited State Budget by the Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia for period 1990 to 2009.
If the measurements indicate the presence of discretionary fiscal policy, the research will continue
to see the effects of discretionary fiscal policy on output and inflation volatility.
In summary, the data required to test the impact of fiscal discretionary policy on output
and inflation volatility is shown in the following table.
Table 2.
Effects of Fiscal Policy Variables on Output Volatility
Variable Description Source
VOL_Y
DISK
VOL_INFL
VOL_WTV
Output volatility of GDP:
moving average - standard deviations 4 quarters
Discretionary fiscal volatility:
mean of standard deviation - 4 quarters
Inflation volatility of IHK: two moving averages standard
deviation 4 quarters (as a control variable)
Volatility in world trade volume:
Average 4 – mean of standard deviations of quarterly
(as a control variable)
Processed from Statistics
Indonesia data
Processed from the error
equation of fiscal discretion
Processed from Statistics
Indonesia data
Data are compiled from IFS,
IMF
Table 3.
Data Used in Inflation Volatility Equations
VOL_INFL
DISK
VOL_KURS
OUTGAP
INFL
Inflation volatility: moving average of standard deviations
4 quarters
Discretionary Fiscal volatility: mean of standard deviation
- 4 quarters
Volatility of the Rupiah / USD: two moving average standard
deviation of 4 quarters (control variable)
Output gap
Inflation
Processed from Statistics
Indonesia data
Processed from the error
Discretionary Fiscal equation
Diolah dari data IFS, IMF
Estimation from the SOFIE
model 2004-Bank Indonesia
Statistics Indonesia
Variable Description Source
3.2. Estimation techniques
This study used two estimation techniques: (i) Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) and
(ii) linear regression model. The first approach, VECM, was used to analyze the effects of fiscal
policy on output and inflation, while the second approach was used to analyze the effects of
discretionary fiscal policy on output and inflation volatility.
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VECM is a VAR model; designed for use in the non-stationary data series andthe series
have a cointegration relationship. The VEC has cointegration relations built into the specification
so that it restricts the long-runbehavior of the endogenous variables to converge to their
cointegrating relationships while allowing for short-run adjustment dynamics. Thecointegration
term is known as theerror correction term since the deviation from long-run equilibrium is
corrected graduallythrough a series of partial short-run adjustments. VECM equations developed
from the unrestricted VAR equationsand can be written as:
(5)
where Y
t
 is the vector of endogenous variables (ltspndrlsa, lttaxrlsa, lgdprlsa, lcpi and ldep_3);
A0 is a vector of exogenous variables in the form of constants A1; is the coefficient matrix for lag
ith
 
 with size (k x k) and e
t 
is a vector of error (residual).
By using the standard model of the VAR in equation (5), structural innovation will be
calculated with:
(6)
If Y
t  
is a vector of endogenous variables with k elements and  , then the
model SVAR can be estimated as follows:
(7)
where 
t
 and e
t 
 consecutively are vector k of observed residual and vector k of unobserved
structural innovation. A and B is the matrix (k x k) to be estimated. Structural innovation e
t
 is
assumed orthonormal so that the covariance matrix is the identity matrix E[e
t
e’
t
)=1. Assuming
orthonormality, the number of necessary restriction is k(k+1) / 2 to complete as many 2k2
unknown parameters in the matrices A and B. So the matrix A is the lower triangular matrix,
while B is the diagonal matrix.
A = dan B = (8)
1 0 0 0 0
a21 1 0 0 0
a31 a32 1 0 0
... ... ... 1 0
a
n1 an2 ... ... 1
b11 0 0 0 0
0 b22 0 0 0
0 0 b33 0 0
0 0 0 b
...
0
0 0 0 0 b
nn
From the equation above, to obtain an equation model of long-term relationships, the
VAR model should be added with lag, so the VECM equation will be as follows:
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(9)
where Y
t
  is (k x 1) vector of endogenous variables; α is the adjustment coefficient which measures
the speed of adjustment of the endogenous variable i to the long term; β is the cointegration
vector; D
t
 is a vector of deterministic terms ; Γ
1
,
 
 ... ... Γp is (k x k) coefficient matrix; C* is the
matrix associated with the deterministic term is used in the model as a constant, with a trend or
seasonal dummy; and u
t 
 the reduced form disturbance.
If there is a total rank r < (k-1) cointegration vectors in matrix β, then this indicates that
the number of columns (k-r) of α is zero. Hence the determination of how many r < (k-1)
contained in the cointegration vector β is similar with determination of how many columns are
zero in α.
The presence of zero column in α  indicates that the cointegration vector in matrix β does
not matter if it is not included in the model that determines the equation (6) above. Therefore,
no information is lost by not modeling the equation and the corresponding variables are weakly
exogenous.
The first step of the VECM method is to test the stationarity of all variables  to determine
the order of integration. The second step is to determine  the optimal number of lag using
unrestricted VARs. VECM equations will be estimated using Johansen»s maximum likelihood
procedure to determine the number of cointegrating vectors and distinguish between long
term and short-term dynamics. Furthermore, testing of serial correlation and heteroscedasticity
will be done using serial correlation with the LM Test and the White Test, respectively. To
obtain the pattern of dynamic adjustment of the VECM model, we also analyze the impulse
response function of the LGDPRLSA and LCPI to one standard deviation shock to other studied
variables.
For Impulse Response Function analysis this study uses the Choleski Decomposition
approach. The order selection (ordering) of fiscal policy between government spending (spending)
and taxes in the equation SVAR and VECM are quite difficult (Perotti, 2002). One alternative is to
see the robustness of two alternative sequences. In this study the selection of the order is
determined by the Granger Causality test. From the results of Granger Test (Table 4), the sequence
on the endogeneitylevel is started with government spending (ltspndrlsa), followed by taxes
(lttaxrlsa) and output (lgdprlsa). Henceforth, the orderof thevariablesdoes not really matter if we
only look at the impactof fiscal policy (Perotti, 2002).
As mentioned previously, the second approach the linear regression model, was used to
see the effect of discretionary fiscal policy on output and inflation volatility. This is done by
estimating the three variants of the equation, namely (i) the cyclically adjusted balance equation,
(ii) the volatility of output equations, and (iii) volatility of the inflation equation.
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Table 4.
Granger Casuality Test
 Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob.
 LTSPNDRSA does not Granger Cause LTTAXRL1SA 76 1.4480 0.2280
 LTTAXRL1SA does not Granger Cause LTSPNDRSA 3.2748 0.0163
 LGDPRLSA does not Granger Cause LTTAXRL1SA 76 3.3644 0.0143
 LTTAXRL1SA does not Granger Cause LGDPRLSA 1.1158 0.3565
 LGDPRLSA does not Granger Cause LTSPNDRSA 76 0.6179 0.6513
 LTSPNDRSA does not Granger Cause LGDPRLSA 1.1515 0.3401
Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Sample: 1990Q1 - 2009Q4
Lags: 4
On output volatility, the regression equation was adopted from Fatas and Mihov (2003)
as shown in equation (10). The volatility of inflation used for the regression equation was
adopted from Rother (2004) shown in equation (11). The measurement of inflation volatility
was done using the unconditional variability of inflation. This method is defined as the deviation
of the monthly inflation rate from its average during the year. Inflation data used is the CPI
inflation. The same definition of volatility is also applied to the Rupiah control variables.
(10)
(11)
Vol_Y
t  
=  α +  βDisk
t  
+ γVariabelKontrol
t
 + v
t
Vol_Inf
t 
l
 
=  α +  βDisk
t  
+ γVariabelKontrol
t
 + v
t
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
VECM estimation begins with the stationarity test for each variable using Augmented
Dickey Fuller (ADF) Test. The Stationarity test result in Table 5 shows that all variables are not
stationary at its level. From this, it is concluded that all variables are integrated at order 1.
The optimal lag number for the VAR procedure is different for each of the criteria (Appendix-
1). Schwarz criteria and Hannah Quin produces the optimal lag 2, while the Akaike criterion
produces 4. In this model the optimal lag determination is based on the criteria of Akaike. VAR
models also have met the criteria of stability in which all values have an inverse roots characteristics
of AR polynomial smaller than one and are all in the unit circle (Appendix-2)
We test the number of cointegrating vectors using the Trace and Maximum Eigen Value
Statistics (Appendix 3). The results of the tests are conducted on the assumption that the data
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Table 6.
Speed of Adjustment and Test Weak Exogeneity
Variable P-value ?2 Statα Standard Error
ltspndrlsa -0.0363 -0.198240 0.8596 0.0313
lttaxrlsa 0.2297 -0.103990 *** 0.0652 3.3993
lgdprlsa -0.0832 -0.025120 *** 0.0034 8.5986
lcpi 0.0177 -0.036310 0.6116 0.2578
ldep3 -0.2590 -0.095830 *** 0.0139 0.0139
***/**/* significant at 1%/5%/10%
Table 5.
Unit Root Test (P Value)
1 LTSPNDRLSA 0.8527 0.2710 0.9630 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001
2 LTTAXRLSA 0.8234 0.0122 0.9984 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
4 LGDPRLSA 0.6542 0.5224 1.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
5 LCPI 0.7784 0.7445 0.9990 0.0002 0.0010 0.0037
6 LDEP3 0.0783 0.0089 0.3898 0.0014 0.0079 0.0001
Level First Difference
No. Variable
Trend Trend +Intercept NoneTrend
Trend +
Intercept None
has a linear trend by including the constant in the cointegrating equation and VAR. The
results of Trace Test and Maximum Eigen Value indicate the presence of 1 (one) cointegrating
equation. This study will estimate the effects of government spending and taxes on output
and inflation.
Table 5 shows the speed of adjustment coefficient of these variables. Furthermore we
conductedweak exogeneity test, which is equivalent with testing whether the speed of
adjustment coefficients of the variables are equal to zero. In cointegration system, if the variable
does not respond to long-term relationship discrepancy, then the variable is declared weakly
exogenous. In other words, no information is lost if the variable is not modeled, so it means a
variable can be inserted into the right side of the VECM equation.
Testing the speed of adjustment coefficient of the variables was done by linear restriction
sonthe coefficients to the VECM long-term equation. The result of the test using the likelihood
ratio test can be seen in Table 6. Government expenditure variable (ltspndrlsa), taxes (lttaxrlsa)
and lcpi are exogenous variables as the p-value is greater than the 5% significance level.
Nevertheless the ldep3 variable can still be expressed as an exogenous variable at a 1%
significance level. It may therefore be concluded that other variables except output (lgdprlsa) is
weakly exogenous.
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The result of VECM testing indicate that variables tax, inflation and interest affecting
output significantly in the long run (Table 7). Inflation and interest rate variables behave as
expected where in the long term an increase in inflation and interest rates may slow output.
Government spending variables have signs as expected but insignificant. On the other hand,
tax has a positive effect on output in the long run. This could mean that the tax revenue is one
of the most important aspects in source of government financing, especially for infrastructure
development. The error correction coefficient for output (α of lgdprlsa) is negative and
significant, indicating there are adjustments to instability in the short term.
Table 7.
The Result of VECM
1.0000 0.0073 1.0663 -0.6616 -0.4733 -0.0534
[-0.02218] [-2.18557] [ 2.90109] [ 3.24231] [-4.23207]
value in [ ] Shows the T statistic
lgdprlsa ltspndrlsa lttaxrlsa lcpi ldep3 errorcorrection
Residual tests of the VECM estimation results indicate that the VECM equation passes the
residual test. LM Test results show a p-value 0.1074, while the White Test showed a  p-value
0.2699.
The pattern of short-term adjustment of the output variable to one standar deviation
shock of the other variables can be shown from the Impulse Response.  The Impulse Response
Function in VECM uses the Cholesky Ordering: LTSPNDRLSA, LGDPRLSA, LTTAXRL1SA, LCPI,
LDEP3.
Figure 3.
Impulse Response Function of Output
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Table 8.
Variance Decomposition of Output
 Period LTSPNDRLSA LTTAXRL1SA LGDPRLSA LCPI LDEP3
1 1.122516 0.628023 98.24946 0 0
2 0.601045 0.502419 85.85251 13.04203 0.002001
3 1.083895 0.660221 80.46457 13.18265 4.608668
4 1.488406 0.919723 74.63147 11.76303 11.19737
5 1.259247 0.796259 71.57523 11.34711 15.02216
6 1.146604 0.822631 70.06114 10.68735 17.28227
7 1.141854 0.868725 68.91182 10.27887 18.79873
8 1.107807 0.891281 67.74219 9.99521 20.26351
9 1.082622 0.896481 66.64153 9.858749 21.52062
10 1.054638 0.892624 65.86026 9.732827 22.45965
11 1.027818 0.896237 65.23625 9.64874 23.19096
12 1.010235 0.900159 64.62339 9.609131 23.85709
13 0.99542 0.914057 64.06173 9.555639 24.47315
14 0.980393 0.926245 63.56744 9.510754 25.01517
15 0.967562 0.937003 63.1533 9.46629 25.47584
Figure 3 shows that a positive shock in government spending have an impact on increasing
output. Shock by 1 standard deviation has an immediate effect on the GDP by raising it 0.2%
in Quarter 1 and later to 0.4% in quarter 4. This response then decreases until it reaches the
stability at 0.26% in period 8. Government tax increase of one standard deviation lowered
output by 0.5% in quarter 3. This response tends to weaken and to achieve stability at 0.32%
in the period-13.
Variance decomposition analysis as contained in table 8 shows that government spending
shock is greater in explaining the change of output than the tax. Fluctuations in output are
explained more by changes in the output itself.
A positive relationship between government spending to output is in line with the theory
and some empirical studies. Based on the Keynesian theory, fiscal policy can drive the economy
because the increased government spending or tax cuts have the multiplier effect by stimulating
additional household demand for consumer goods. These results are also consistent with research
by Blanchard and Perotti (1999), Perotti (2002), Mountford and Uhlig (2002), Kruscek (2003),
and Castro (2003), each of which used a sample of the U.S., OECD, European Union, Germany
and Spain. They found that a positive shock in government spending has a positive impact on
output. These results are also consistent with research by Schlarek (2005) who used a sample
of developing countries as well as the application of macro models for Indonesia»s economy
(SOFIE and SEMAR) but with a different degree of influence on output.
In SOFIE, the increase in government spending, either in consumption or investment,
amounting to Rp10 trillion will increase GDP by 0.3%. While the addition of government
spending for infrastructure programs of Rp10, 8 trillion would increase GDP by 0.0512% in the
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model SEMAR. The difference is probably caused by the influence of the nature of these two
different models, namely SOFIE who is dynamic, while SEMAR more static. The dominant
influence of government spending to GDP compared with the tax effects in the short-term
suggests this policy is still effective enough to stimulate economic growth, especially in times of
recession.
Related to these findings, efforts to increase the absorption of the budget are important.
Throughout the 2002-2009 expenditure budget was generally always below the APBNP, with
the exception of the years 2007-2008. Under conditions where actual revenues surpass the
(plan) budget and the realization of expenditures is under budget, over-taxation is feared, and
would interfere with the aim to encourage economic activity.
Figure 4. Realisation of
Revenue and Spending  (in percentage to the revised budget)
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The test results with the same method to analyze the effect of government spending and
taxation to inflation suggests that there is no cointegration relationship between inflation with
the fiscal policy variables.The error correction coefficient of inflation is not significant despite
having a negative value (Appendix 4). Therefore to test the effect on inflation, a SVAR approach
was used with a restriction in the long-run equation as follows:
(11)
1 .. .. .. ..
.. 1 .. .. ..
.. .. 1 .. ..
γ41 γ42 ... 1 ..
0 0 ... ... 1
l tspndelsa
lt taxrlsa
lgdprsla
lcpi
ldep3
Each coefficient Yij shows a structural shock from variable j to variable i with a direct
effect. The diagonal matrix elements are normalized to 1 and the empty cells are restricted to
be zero. Structural factorization is used for further testing of the IRF.
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In principle, the SVAR method requires stationary data.Nonetheless, considering the use
of  data in first difference produces highly oscilating pattern, we proceed with the data in level.
The use of data in level is aimed  to see the pattern of relationship between fiscal policy and not
to see the magnitude impact of shock between the variables.
From the impulse response function, positive shock of government spending will be
responded with a decrease in inflation (left panel of Figure 5). The shock of onestandard deviation
of government spending first will increase the inflation but then decrease in fourth quarter. The
effect disappeared after 22nd quarter. The negative influence of a positive shock in government
spending is in line with several studies, i.e. Fatas and Mihov [2003] and Mountford and Uhlig
[2002], where government spending has a negative impact on inflation.
The negative impact of  shock government spending to inflation might be due to  the
greater of multiplier effect of government investment expenditure (including infrastructure)
compared to the routine expenditures. Government spending on infrastructure is expected to
improve the distribution of goods and services thereby contributing to the decline in inflation.
Meanwhile, a positive shock to the tax will increase inflation (right panel of Figure 5). The
finding that the tax shock increases will affect inflation is less consistent with the goals of fiscal
policy to influence aggregate demand. An increase in Value Added Tax, for example, will affect
the consumption decisions of economic actors, so it will impact on the decline in inflationary
pressures (Wren Lewis (2002) in Hermawan and Munro (2008)). One of the arguments for
these findings sees tax increases as a way to increase production costs by the manufacturer,
thus causing an increase in selling price of goods to consumers. To strengthen this argument,
further study is needed to explore the impact of tax increase in producer prices. Another argument
is that inflation is caused by factors beyond fiscal policy, such as imported inflation, output gap,
monetary policy and structural policy of the government, so that no tax increases of itself won»t
affect inflation.
Figure 5.
Impulse Response Function: Inflation
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Table 9.
Variance Inflation of Inflation
 Period LTSPNDRLSA LTTAXRL1SA LGDPRLSA LCPI LDEP3
1 0.0086 0.1633 30.3594 69.4687 0.0000
2 0.0232 0.7683 44.5401 54.1220 0.5464
3 0.1209 1.1959 48.1340 49.4698 1.0795
4 0.3207 1.8523 47.3446 48.6620 1.8205
5 0.6261 2.3293 46.4992 47.9773 2.5681
6 0.8979 2.6025 45.4668 47.9937 3.0391
7 1.1390 2.7537 44.4498 48.3676 3.2899
8 1.3682 2.7958 43.5067 48.9493 3.3800
9 1.5294 2.7841 42.6642 49.6469 3.3754
10 1.6396 2.7450 41.9571 50.3287 3.3297
11 1.6986 2.7052 41.3920 50.9236 3.2807
12 1.7144 2.6795 40.9642 51.3889 3.2530
13 1.7083 2.6721 40.6506 51.7114 3.2576
14 1.6954 2.6799 40.4264 51.9024 3.2959
15 1.6899 2.6979 40.2640 51.9841 3.3641
The test results show that the variance decomposition of inflation (CPI) is explained more
by changes in government spending than tax variables. Fluctuations in inflation are explained
more by changes in this variable and the changes in output.
Meanwhile, in relation to discretionary fiscal policy, using government expenditure data
ranging of from 1990 to 2009, there is a deviation between the initial plan and the realization.
In the figure 6, we can see before the crisis of 1997/98 the deviation between the planned
government expenditure and therealization expenditurebefore the crisis of 1997/98 was relatively
small. In the post-crisis, the behavior of these deviations tends to enlarge. If the deviation is
calculated as a percentage of the plan, then during the period of the sample the standard
deviation is 19.4%.
Figure 6. Realisation of
Revenue and Spending  (in percentage to the revised budget)
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Stationarity test of the deviation of expenditure shows that it is stationary. Therefore, it
can be concluded that the deviation has not demonstrated the existence of discretionary fiscal
policy, hence testing for the effects on output and inflation volatility is not necessary.
The higher deviation of the post-crisis economy 1998 is partly due to Indonesia»s economy
becoming increasingly integrated with the global economy. Consequently, the shock that
occurred in the global economy will affect the achievement of the macroeconomic assumptions
used in budget planning. Oil price increases beyond the specified assumptionsoften force the
government to review its spending plans. Review of expenditures is mainly related to the soaring
fuel subsidies and transfers of funds to the regions. Adjustment of government spending since
the 1998 economic crisis is not as easy to pre-crisis period as the government is committed to
reduce its debt ratio gradually and control the fiscal deficit. In addition, the increasing role of
parliament (DPR) in the budget process makes the government»s budget adjustment process
more complex.
V. CONCLUSION
An increase in government spending has a positive shock to GDP while tax increases
have negative effects. The positive effects of government spending and the negative effect of
the tax to GDP are in line with Keynes» theory about the role of government in stimulatingthe
economy and in accordance with empirical studies in several countries. Thegreater effect of
government expenditure shock on GDP compared to tax policy represents the effectiveness of
government spending to stimulate economic growth, especially in times of recession. The
negative effect of positive government spending shock to the inflation can be explained by the
possibility of greater multiplier effects of government spending on investments (including
infrastructure) than routine expenditures. Government spending on infrastructure is expected
to improve the distribution of goods and services thereby contributing to the decline in inflation.
Meanwhile, the effect of rising inflation due to a positive tax shock is likely triggered by increasing
production costs as  a response to increasing tax cost.
The deviation of government expenditure to itsplan was relatively smaller before the
economic crisis in 1997/98than the post-crisis period. The deviation becomes larger after the
crises due to the increasingly integration of domestic economy with the global economy.  This
condition affecting the realization of government spending. The deviation during the sample
period (1990 - 2009) did not show any significant difference, so it can be concluded that
discretionary fiscal policy was not present during this period.
The conclusions above have clear policy implications. Taking into account the positive
effect of the increase in government expenditure to the GDP, it suggests that the absorption
rate can be pursued in accordance with the budget spending plans in the APBNP. The absorption
of the budget needs to be optimized considering actual revenues that exceed the plan could
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raise fears of over-taxation on the economy. In academic terms, these studies suggest
improvement of the model to examine the effect of fiscal policy on inflation. One way is to
include the elasticity of expenditure and taxation to the inflation in the preparation of the
model.
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VAR Lag Order Selection Criteria
Endogenous variables: LTSPNDRLSA LGDPRLSA LTTAXRLSA LCPI LDEP3
Exogenous variables: C
Sample: 1990Q1 2009Q4
Included observations: 73
 Lag LogL LR FPE AIC SC HQ
0 57.0542 NA 0.0000 -1.4261 -1.2693 -1.3636
1 434.4097 692.6800 0.0000 -11.0797 -10.1384 -10.7046
2 488.1510 91.2866 0.0000 -11.8672  -10.14146* -11.1794
3 522.7159 53.9780 0.0000 -12.1292 -9.6191 -11.1289
4 562.4445   56.59970*   2.70e-12*  -12.53273* -9.2382  -11.21981*
5 585.2919 29.4200 0.0000 -12.4738 -8.3949 -10.8482
6 612.2406 31.0095 0.0000 -12.5271 -7.6638 -10.5890
7 627.5594 15.5286 0.0000 -12.2619 -6.6142 -10.0112
 * indicates lag order selected by the criterion
Appendix 1. Optimal Lag
Appendix 2. Model Stability Test
Root Modulus
Roots of Characteristic Polynomial
Endogenous variables: LTSPNDRLSA LGDPRLSA LTTAXRL1SA LCPI LDEP3
Exogenous variables: C
Lag specification: 1 4
Date: 04/03/12   Time: 17:12
 0.994155  0.994155
 0.917443 - 0.122319i  0.925561
 0.917443 + 0.122319i  0.925561
 0.742630 - 0.256660i  0.785732
 0.742630 + 0.256660i  0.785732
-0.492782 + 0.589932i  0.768670
-0.492782 - 0.589932i  0.768670
-0.616799 + 0.352775i  0.710557
-0.616799 - 0.352775i  0.710557
 0.558647 - 0.400280i  0.687249
 0.558647 + 0.400280i  0.687249
 0.156244 + 0.668743i  0.686753
 0.156244 - 0.668743i  0.686753
-0.226525 + 0.603912i  0.644999
-0.226525 - 0.603912i  0.644999
 0.450115 + 0.441664i  0.630611
 0.450115 - 0.441664i  0.630611
-0.609034 - 0.095091i  0.616413
-0.609034 + 0.095091i  0.616413
 0.206423  0.206423
No root lies outside the unit circle.
VAR satisfies the stability condition.
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Date: 04/10/12   Time: 16:54
Sample (adjusted): 1991Q2 2009Q4
Included observations: 75 after adjustments
Trend assumption: Linear deterministic trend
Series: LTSPNDRLSA LTTAXRL1SA LGDPRLSA LCPI LDEP3
Lags interval (in first differences): 1 to 4
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)
Hypothesized Trace 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.365944 72.79943 69.81889 0.0284
At most 1 0.206186 38.62804 47.85613 0.2753
At most 2 0.135779 21.31011 29.79707 0.3386
At most 3 0.09481 10.36561 15.49471 0.2536
At most 4 0.037862 2.894787 3.841466 0.0889
 Trace test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue)
Hypothesized Max-Eigen 0.05
No. of CE(s) Eigenvalue Statistic Critical Value Prob.**
None * 0.365944 34.17138 33.87687 0.0461
At most 1 0.206186 17.31793 27.58434 0.5527
At most 2 0.135779 10.9445 21.13162 0.6529
At most 3 0.09481 7.470822 14.2646 0.435
At most 4 0.037862 2.894787 3.841466 0.0889
 Max-eigenvalue test indicates 1 cointegrating eqn(s) at the 0.05 level
 * denotes rejection of the hypothesis at the 0.05 level
 **MacKinnon-Haug-Michelis (1999) p-values
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Appendix 4. Estimasi Result: VECM
LTSPNDRLSA(-1)  0.350446 LCPI(-1)  1.000000
 (0.33155)
[ 1.05698] LDEP3(-1)  0.296498
 (0.15357)
LTTAXRLSA(-1) -2.404.557 [ 1.93065]
 (0.44469)
[-5.40730] C -1.649.441
LGDPRLSA(-1)  1.814859
 (0.55448)
[ 3.27308]
   
Error Correction: D(LTSPNDRLSA)  D(LTTAXRLSA) D(LGDPRLSA) D(LCPI) D(LDEP3)
CointEq1 -0.016469  0.129543 -0.046010  0.009857 -0.141450
 (0.10942)  (0.05716)  (0.01387)  (0.02006)  (0.05288)
 [-0.15052] [ 2.26644] [-3.31696] [ 0.49141] [-2.67506]
D(LTSPNDRLSA(-1)) -1.094.965 -0.229310  0.002683 -0.001967  0.037956
 (0.12800)  (0.06687)  (0.01623)  (0.02347)  (0.06186)
 [-8.55411] [-3.42938] [ 0.16536] [-0.08384] [ 0.61358]
D(LTSPNDRLSA(-2)) -0.734586 -0.235978  0.013071 -0.004100  0.038420
 (0.16471)  (0.08604)  (0.02088)  (0.03019)  (0.07960)
 [-4.45979] [-2.74260] [ 0.62598] [-0.13579] [ 0.48267]
D(LTSPNDRLSA(-3)) -0.280343 -0.105123  0.018449 -0.010099  0.036076
 (0.12662)  (0.06614)  (0.01605)  (0.02321)  (0.06119)
 [-2.21404] [-1.58931] [ 1.14936] [-0.43506] [ 0.58956]
D(LTTAXRLSA(-1)) -0.249298 -0.558809 -0.086878  0.022489 -0.305089
 (0.29948)  (0.15644)  (0.03797)  (0.05490)  (0.14473)
[-0.83244] [-3.57202] [-2.28833] [ 0.40963] [-2.10803]
D(LTTAXRLSA(-2))  0.147637 -0.147280 -0.081589  0.005455 -0.021043
 (0.30229)  (0.15791)  (0.03832)  (0.05542)  (0.14609)
 [ 0.48839] [-0.93268] [-2.12900] [ 0.09843] [-0.14404]
D(LTTAXRLSA(-3))  0.416239  0.085310 -0.065152  0.020237  0.017948
 (0.22839)  (0.11930)  (0.02895)  (0.04187)  (0.11037)
 [ 1.82250] [ 0.71506] [-2.25023] [ 0.48335] [ 0.16261]
D(LGDPRLSA(-1))  0.108064  1.461107 -0.263857 -0.421717  0.237213
 (1.09061)  (0.56971)  (0.13826)  (0.19993)  (0.52705)
 [ 0.09909] [ 2.56465] [-1.90842] [-2.10935] [ 0.45007]
D(LGDPRLSA(-2))  0.355318  0.957606 -0.207556 -0.275601 -0.489015
 (1.16903)  (0.61067)  (0.14820)  (0.21430)  (0.56495)
 [ 0.30394] [ 1.56812] [-1.40051] [-1.28604] [-0.86560]
D(LGDPRLSA(-3)) -0.200920  1.591497  0.061318  0.090706  0.101873
 (1.14284)  (0.59699)  (0.14488)  (0.20950)  (0.55229)
 [-0.17581] [ 2.66587] [ 0.42323] [ 0.43297] [ 0.18446]
D(LCPI(-1))  0.016755  0.529491 -0.363295  0.212835  1.667080
 (0.79316)  (0.41433)  (0.10055)  (0.14540)  (0.38331)
 [ 0.02112] [ 1.27795] [-3.61304] [ 1.46379] [ 4.34921]
D(LCPI(-2)) -0.180686  0.017076  0.132116  0.125574 -0.731970
 (0.94055)  (0.49132)  (0.11924)  (0.17242)  (0.45453)
 [-0.19211] [ 0.03476] [ 1.10803] [ 0.72831] [-1.61038]
D(LCPI(-3)) -0.312651 -0.242254  0.264951 -0.357680  0.104051
 (0.89440)  (0.46721)  (0.11338)  (0.16396)  (0.43223)
 [-0.34957] [-0.51851] [ 2.33675] [-2.18154] [ 0.24073]
D(LDEP3(-1))  0.023586  0.111538  0.016343  0.028199  0.678171
 (0.27414)  (0.14321)  (0.03475)  (0.05026)  (0.13248)
 [ 0.08604] [ 0.77886] [ 0.47026] [ 0.56112] [ 5.11890]
Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1  Cointegrating Eq: CointEq1
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Appendix 4. Estimasi Result: VECM (continued)
Error Correction: D(LTSPNDRLSA)  D(LTTAXRLSA) D(LGDPRLSA) D(LCPI) D(LDEP3)
CointEq1 -0.016469  0.129543 -0.046010  0.009857 -0.141450
D(LDEP3(-2)) -0.251268 -0.286280 -0.082208  0.078772 -0.310979
 (0.31699)  (0.16559)  (0.04019)  (0.05811)  (0.15319)
 [-0.79267] [-1.72888] [-2.04572] [ 1.35559] [-2.03003]
D(LDEP3(-3))  0.354824 -0.081816  0.004288 -0.025682  0.022870
 (0.23332)  (0.12188)  (0.02958)  (0.04277)  (0.11276)
 [ 1.52076] [-0.67128] [ 0.14497] [-0.60045] [ 0.20283]
C  0.035649 -0.025044  0.020819  0.034647 -0.029616
 (0.07047)  (0.03681)  (0.00893)  (0.01292)  (0.03406)
 [ 0.50586] [-0.68031] [ 2.33035] [ 2.68195] [-0.86961]
R-squared  0.694138  0.644135  0.379310  0.418202  0.699933
Adj. R-squared  0.611192  0.547629  0.210987  0.260427  0.618560
Sum sq. resids  1.835392  0.500834  0.029497  0.061678  0.428642
S.E. equation  0.176376  0.092134  0.022360  0.032333  0.085236
F-statistic  8.368591  6.674573  2.253465  2.650614  8.601442
Log likelihood  33.65273  83.00481  190.6203  162.5899  88.91959
Akaike AIC -0.438230 -1.736.969 -4.568.956 -3.831.314 -1.892.621
Schwarz SC  0.083119 -1.215.620 -4.047.608 -3.309.966 -1.371.273
Mean dependent  0.012482  0.018624  0.012903  0.026216 -0.012755
S.D. dependent  0.282860  0.136985  0.025172  0.037597  0.138009
Determinant resid covariance (dof adj.)  5.45E-13
Determinant resid covariance  1.54E-13
Log likelihood  581.9836
Akaike information criterion -1.294.694
Schwarz criterion -1.018.686
Included observations: 76 after adjustments,  Standard errors in ( ) & t-statistics in [ ].  Sample (adjusted) covers 1991Q1
2009Q4 with Cointegration Restrictions: B(1,4)=1, Convergence achieved after 1 iterations. Restrictions identify all cointegrating
vectors and are not binding (LR test not available)
